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The protection motivation theory (PMT) is widely used in behavioral information security research, with multiple 
instantiations of the theoretical model applied in the literature.  The purpose of this study is to perform a theoretical 
(conceptual) replication of both the core and full (PMT) nomologies in the context of voluntary password manager 
application use for individual home end-users.  In our study, the full PMT model explained more variance than the core 
PMT model, but the relationships between multiple behavioral antecedents differed between the core and full PMT 
models, possibly due to differences in model complexity.  Our findings suggest that researchers should justify the version 
of the PMT that they choose to use based on their research objectives with the understanding that the same variables 
may be significant in one version of the PMT but not significant in another version of the PMT. 
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1 Introduction 
There are numerous theoretical models used in the behavioral information security literature, but one of the 
most common is protection motivation theory (PMT) (Aurigemma, 2013).  The PMT focuses on the cognitive 
processes by which individuals assess a threat and how they feel they can cope with that threat as leading 
indicators of their intent to perform a behavior (Rogers, 1975, 1983).  The appraisal of the threat and coping 
responses results in the intention to perform (or not perform) a particular information security action 
(Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008).  The PMT is attractive to information security researchers because it 
focuses on both a threat and a prevailing countermeasure to mitigate that threat (Crossler & Belanger, 2014; 
Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000).  Given the logical fit between security related behaviors and the 
PMT, information security researchers have suggested that the PMT has wide generalizability across many 
different types of behavioral information security issues (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015; 
Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2015, Warkentin, Johnston, Walden, & Straub, 2016).  However, the level of 
generalizability associated with the PMT constructs remains an open theoretical and empirical question 
partially due to the many different variations of the PMT that have been used in the prior literature. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a replication of the core PMT models as used by Warkentin, 
Johnston, Shropshire, and Barnett (2016) and Siponen, Mahmood, and Pahnila (2014) along with the full 
PMT nomology as used by Boss et al. (2015) and Posey et al. (2015).  This paper replicates these two 
different instantiations of the PMT using the voluntary adoption of password manager applications (i.e., 
applications used to manage a user’s passwords across multiple websites and devices) for home end-users.  
Password managers and home end-users are interesting contexts to replicate the PMT because the 
adoption of password managers is completely voluntary for home end-users with minimal organizational 
variables to potentially confound the results.  In our study, the full PMT model explained more variance than 
the core PMT model, but the relationships between multiple behavioral antecedents differed between the 
core and full PMT models due to differences in model complexity.  Our findings suggest that researchers 
must justify theoretically the version of the PMT that they choose to use based on their research objective 
because the same variables (i.e., self-efficacy and response efficacy) may be significant in one version of 
the PMT but not significant in another version of the PMT. 
2 Protection Motivation Theory 
The PMT relies upon the use of fear appeals to engender threats in order to motivate protective security 
behaviors.  Fear appeals are “a persuasive communication that attempts to arouse fear in order to promote 
a precautionary motivation and self-protective action” (Ruiter, Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 2014, p. 65).   The 
PMT suggests that fear appeals motivate two cognitive processes: 1) threat appraisal and 2) coping 
responses.  The threat appraisal is an assessment of the threat severity and personal susceptibility to that 
threat, whereas coping responses are assessments of the effectiveness of the potential responses and 
one’s ability to undertake the responses.  Both of these cognitive processes results in high or low protection 
motivations to perform (or not perform) a particular information security action (Boss et al., 2015; Workman 
et al., 2008).   
It is important to note that a fear appeal is more than just a threatening message; Witte, Meyer, and Martell 
(2001) argue that successful1 fear appeals must include both a threat appraisal and a coping response.  
Having the threat appraisal without the coping response in a fear appeal message typically results in an 
unsuccessful fear appeal (Boss et al., 2015; Witte et al., 2001).  A successful threat appraisal articulates 
the magnitude of the threat along with the real possibility that the danger associated with the threat can 
occur to the participant (on a personal level).  A successful coping response communicates how the 
prescriptive solution works, demonstrates that it is within the capability of the recipient of the message, and 
addresses common barriers from performing the designated response.  Prior research has demonstrated 
that fear appeals containing these two components can activate protection motivation even with small levels 
of fear in the fear appeal message (Gore et al., 2015; Ruiter et al., 2014).  However, high scare tactics 
without coupling those scare tactics with proper coping responses may not motivate protective actions (Gore 
et al., 2015; Witte et al., 2001).  
                                                     
1 Per Ruiter et al. (2014), fear appeal messages are more appropriately classified as successful or unsuccessful rather than high versus 
low fear appeal messages as tested by Boss et al. (2015).  Gore and Bracken (2005) show that only a marginal amount of threat is 
necessary in a fear appeal to motivate protective actions. 
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In the “core” PMT, coping responses consist of an individual’s self-efficacy (belief in one’s ability) to perform 
a security action, the perceived response efficacy (perceived effectiveness) of the required action, whereas 
threat appraisals capture the perception of one’s vulnerability (perceived likelihood that the threat will occur) 
from the related security threat and the perceived severity (perceived impact of the threat) of the security 
threat being studied (Siponen et al., 2014; Warkentin et al., 2016).  Figure 1 displays the core PMT model.  
In general (with a few reported exceptions), higher self-efficacy, higher response efficacy, greater perceived 
vulnerabilities, and greater perceived severities have been shown to lead to increased protection 
motivations regarding a wide variety of behavioral information security issues (Crossler, Long, Loraas, & 
Trinkle, 2014; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015; 
Putri & Hovav, 2014; Wall, Palvia, & Lowry, 2013; Warkentin et al., 2016; Workman et al., 2008). 
While there is wide agreement in the related literature regarding the behavioral elements identified in the 
core PMT, researchers are not in agreement about the wide variety of theoretical extensions to the PMT 
that have been proposed in the prior literature.  For example, Chen and Zahedi (2016) used the core PMT 
constructs in Figure 1 but added a higher-order construct (perceived threat) to capture threat appraisals, 
which are influenced by both perceived threat susceptibility and severity.  Doing so, however, creates a 
formative versus reflective construct definition issue along with measurement issues that are still open for 
debate.  Additionally, both Johnston and Warkentin (2010) and Johnston et al. (2015) utilize the core PMT 
constructs albeit with different theorized relationships.  Johnston and Warkentin (2010) propose a PMT 
model where the threat appraisal constructs are antecedents to the coping constructs.  The Johnston et al. 
(2015) PMT model builds off the Johnston and Warkentin (2010) model by adding both a direct effect of the 
threat appraisal constructs on protection motivations as well as an indirect effect through coping appraisals.  
Both of their models propose interesting instantiations of the PMT but are also significant deviations from 
the PMT’s historical roots.  Despite these variations, the core PMT model identified in Figure 1 presents the 
simplest interpretation, which has been widely used in recent behavioral information security studies such 
as Warkentin et al. (2016) and Siponen et al. (2014).  Therefore, this paper replicates the core model of the 
PMT that is displayed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Core PMT Model 
 
Recently, both Posey et al. (2015) and Boss et al. (2015) have proposed the use of a “full” PMT nomology 
to explain behavioral information security problems.  Figure 2 displays the full PMT nomology.  Both Posey 
et al. (2015) and Boss et al. (2015) present the full PMT nomology as a full conceptual implementation of 
the theory based upon their interpretation of the theoretical roots of the PMT (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 
1997).  Their full PMT nomology includes the following three factors: 1) response cost (the perceived cost 
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in terms of money, time, and cognitive resources) as an important addition to coping appraisal 2 , 2) 
maladaptive rewards (any kind of reward for not partaking in the prescribed protective action) as an 
additional component of one’s threat appraisal mechanism and 3) perceived fear resulting from a specific 
fear-appeal impetus.  Maladaptive rewards addresses the impact of perceived benefits (implicit or explicit) 
of continuing risky behaviors (Floyd et al., 2000).  Adding maladaptive rewards to the PMT allows a 
conditional proposition that would otherwise not be considered – if no threat is perceived or the reward for 
not taking the protective action is greater than the perceived threat, the person subject to the fear appeal 
may not activate their coping appraisal mechanisms and protection motivation (Boss et al., 2015). 
Fear, while an inherent component of every PMT-related study that utilizes a fear appeal, has not 
traditionally been measured as a separate construct that directly (or indirectly) impacts protection motivation 
or influences other behavioral antecedents (Boss et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015).  In their full PMT 
nomology, Boss et al. (2015) and Posey et al. (2015) argue that perceived fear from an information security 
threat not only directly impacts protection motivation but also partially mediates the effects of perceived 
threat severity and vulnerability.  Measuring fear in this manner not only provides a direct measurement of 
the effectiveness of the fear appeal message used for the information security threat of interest but it also 
allows the examination of the impact of that fear on both threat perceptions and protection motivation (Boss 
et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 2. Full PMT Model 
The full PMT nomology is a more articulated representation of the theoretical roots of the PMT, which 
contributes a deeper understanding of the behavioral antecedents affecting protection motivations.  In doing 
so, however, the full PMT becomes a less parsimonious behavioral model, which leads to potential data 
collection issues (more and varied data need to be collected) as well as complicates future exploration of 
other behavioral factors that, in conjunction with PMT variables, improve understanding of protection 
motivation.  Therefore, it is important to compare the core PMT model with the full PMT model to determine 
if the cost of being less parsimonious has more explanatory power in the context of the specific behavioral 
information security problem being investigated. 
                                                     
2 Boss et al. (2015) include response costs in their declaration of the core PMT nomology. However, we agree with Posey et al. (2015) 
that response costs are less prevalent in the behavioral information security PMT literature and, thus, we include the response cost 
construct in the full nomology only. 
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3 Research Design and Methods 
To empirically test the core and full PMT nomologies in the context of password managers, we employed a 
sequential two-part study of the adoption (or non-adoption) of a password manager application.3  Part 1 
consisted of presenting a poor password management fear appeal message immediately followed by a 
survey to capture self-reported perceptions of the factors that affect home end-user security behavior 
intentions.  Part 2, which occurred one week after the completion of Part 1 of the study, captured actual 
security behavior of the participant.  This process is consistent with Boss et al. (2015) and Warkentin et al. 
(2016) who captured both actual security behaviors and behavioral intentions. 
3.1 Participants 
We sampled undergraduate college students from a private university in the Midwest portion of the United 
States.  While academics often criticize the use of college students as the sample population in research, 
much of that criticism comes from trying to generalize the results of student derived data to other 
organizational contexts (Peterson, 2001).  When investigating home end-user information security practices, 
college students are an excellent population to study due to their extensive use of technology, familiarity 
with online applications, and lack of conscientiousness with their information privacy and security practices 
(Drennan, Sullivan, & Previte, 2006).   
3.2 Constructs and Measures 
We adapted pre-validated (reflective) scales from previous behavioral information security research (as 
documented in Boss et al. (2015)) to measure all of our latent constructs.  We measured all items reflectively 
using 7-point Likert scales ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree.  Appendix A provides 
the items, means, standard deviations, and factor loadings. As mentioned earlier, the fear appeal is an 
essential part of any PMT study.  In this study, we built our fear appeal based on the guidelines presented 
by Witte et al. (2001) and Ruiter et al. (2014).  We formatted the fear appeal in a video (see Appendix B for 
the video link and the transcript).  We developed the contents and video format of the message through a 
series of three pilot studies conducted with 16 Management Information Systems (MIS) students in an 
introductory information security course.  After each pilot, we made small modifications to the video in order 
to ensure that the video was eliciting a successful fear appeal.  The participants in the pilot studies included 
a mix of 50% American and 50% International students of which only three had prior working knowledge of 
password managers. 
3.3 Primary Data Collection 
A total of 372 undergraduate students were provided the opportunity to participate in this study in return for 
a small amount of extra credit in their course (between 1 and 2% depending on the instructor).  The first 
part of the study provided the participants with a link to an online video that included a fear appeal message 
related to poor password management and an online survey to measure all of the behavioral constructs 
including their intent to install and use a password manager within the following week.  The second part of 
the study was conducted one week later to ascertain whether the participants followed through with the 
security behavior.  In part two of the study, we asked the participants whether they took the action to 
download and use the recommended password manager application or some other password manager.  If 
participants indicated that they adopted a password manager, we asked several questions that could be 
answered only by using the “Security Challenge” tool in the password manager, which included the relative 
strength of their master password, total security score for all their accounts, and total number of accounts 
in their password manager application after initial use. 
Individual survey participation was voluntary and responses were de-identified prior to data analysis.   We 
collected a total of 286 responses for the first part of the study, which represents a 77% response rate.  
Three participants dropped out before part 2, which left us with 283 usable data points.  We used covariance-
based structural equation modeling (CBSEM) with version 23 of AMOS to evaluate construct relationships 
and model fit.  CBSEM is an appropriate analysis method when testing proposed relationships between 
latent constructs of a theoretically derived, a priori model (Lowry & Gaskin, 2014; Raykov, 2006), which is 
                                                     
3 Boss et al. (2015) compared a high and a low fear appeal message in their study.  We are not attempting to compare different fear 
appeals in this theoretical replication.  Instead, we are testing the core and full PMT nomology given a specific fear appeal that did 
quantifiably generate a level of fear coupled with a coping response. 
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the case for our study.  Prior to conducting CBSEM analyses, we successfully screened the data for issues 
that may jeopardize the results, such as outliers, multicollinearity, non-normality, and missing data (Byrne, 
2001; Kline, 2011). 
3.4 Instrument Validity and Structural Path Analysis 
CBSEM consists of two parts: (1) a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) stage and (2) the structural model 
analysis (also known as path analysis) stage (Heck, 1998).  The CFA stage assesses the quality and validity 
of the construct measures and is performed on the entire set of measurement items for all latent constructs 
simultaneously with each observed variable restricted to load on its a priori factor.  We examined the 
average variance extracted (AVE) to ensure individual item reliability and convergent validity.  Table 1 
displays the measurement item loadings on their respective constructs in the factor loading column.  All 
factor loadings were in the range of 0.666 – 0.991.  While the recommended threshold for item loadings is 
0.7, individual item loadings between .40 and .70 are acceptable for inclusion as long as composite 
reliabilities are above .70 (which they were for all constructs) (Chin, 1998).  The AVE values were greater 
than the minimum recommended value of 0.50 in our data, which indicates that the items satisfied the 
convergent validity requirements.   
 
Table 1. Confirmatory factor analysis results 
Construct CR AVE MSV ASV Fear PMI TSEV PVUL REFF SEFF COST MAL 
Fear .848 .650 .236 .109 .806               
PMI .966 .904 .187 .113 .374 .951             
TSEV .840 .639 .236 .115 .486 .271 .800           
PVUL .793 .563 .195 .087 .442 .139 .359 .751         
REFF .868 .688 .355 .146 .285 .361 .457 .440 .830       
SEFF .860 .672 .355 .170 .325 .427 .361 .263 .596 .820     
COST .820 .604 .436 .125 -.057 -.432 -.127 .066 -.161 -.451 .777   
MAL .908 .715 .436 .097 -.005 -.237 -.099 -.012 -.170 -.383 .660 .845 
Legend: CR = Composite Reliability, AVE = Average Variance Explained, MSV = Maximum Shared Squared 
Variance, ASV = Average Shared Squared Variance, PMI = Protection Motivation Intention, TSEV = Perceived 
Threat Severity, PVUL = Perceived Threat Vulnerability, MAL = Maladaptive Rewards, REFF = Response Efficacy, 
SEFF = Self Efficacy, COST = Response Costs 
 
Due to the nature of our data collection instrument, common method variance attributed to measurement 
method instead of the constructs of interest may bias our results (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 
2003).  We took several steps to mitigate and assess the potential of common method bias per the guidance 
in Gefen et al. (2011) and Podsakoff et al. (2003).   First, we used the security challenge to objectively 
determine actual use, which mitigates this problem for actual usage but not for behavioral intentions.  
Second, we used survey best practices to minimize the possible impact of common method bias (Dillman, 
Smyth, & Christian, 2014).  For instance, study participation was completely voluntary, respondents were 
assured anonymity prior to data analysis (i.e., we removed email address identifiers to match participants 
with both parts of the study after data aggregation and prior to analyzing any data), and the survey 
instructions stated that there were no right or wrong answers so respondents could answer honestly.  Third, 
we conducted the unmeasured latent methods construct (ULMC) approach in accordance with Richardson, 
Simmering, and Sturman (2009).  This method compares the standardized loadings of the items on their 
respective constructs between CFAs with and without the ULMC marker construct.  For our sample, the 
average difference across all items’ standardized loadings was less than 0.01 with a maximum difference 
of 0.070.  Additionally, none of the measured construct items loaded significantly on the marker construct.  
While the results of the ULMC analysis and the above mitigations do not completely negate the possibility 
of common method variance, it does suggest that it is not a major concern in our data. 
To ensure the discriminant validity of the latent constructs in the research model, we examined the AVE, 
maximum shared squared variance (MSV), and average shared squared variance (ASV).  Table 1 displays 
all of these values.  In our data, the MSV and ASV were both less than the AVE, which is evidence of 
discriminant validity because the construct items load more on their respective latent variables than on other 
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constructs (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  Based upon the criteria set forth in Jarvis et al. (2003) 
and Petter et al. (2007), all of the construct measures met the requirements to be considered reflective 
indicators of their respective latent constructs.  Finally, the model fit for the CFA analysis (which includes all 
latent constructs) was satisfactory (χ2 = 419.32, df = 247, χ2/df = 1.698; CFI = 0.963; SRMR = .0424).   
Following establishment of the measurement model in the CFA stage, we fit the data to the a priori research 
models as shown in Figures 1 and 2.  We assessed initial model fit using multiple criteria such as chi-square, 
degrees of freedom, and normed chi-square (χ2/df) (Heck, 1998; Kline, 2011; Raykov, 2006).  To further 
account for the potential impact of even mild deviations from perfectly normal data distributions on the χ2 
calculations, we conducted Bollen-Stine (1992) bootstrapping to calculate model fit p-values, which were all 
above the common 0.05 threshold.  However, reliance upon χ2 measurements alone for model fit 
determination is cautioned.  As such, we used one goodness-of-fit and one badness-of-fit metric to further 
assess overall model fit (Heck, 1998). 
We used the comparative fit index (CFI) as our goodness-of-fit metric.  The CFI measures model fit relative 
to a null model and non-centrality index.  In our data, the CFI values for the core and full PMT CBSEM 
model evaluation were above the 0.90 (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004) or the 0.95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
recommended thresholds.  We used the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), which compares 
the residuals (unexplained variance) to what would be reasonably expected from a well-fitting model, as our 
badness-of-fit metric.  In all of our models, the SRMR were below the common threshold of 0.08, which 
indicates good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).   
4 Results 
4.1 Part 1: Modelling Protection Motivation 
Table 2 displays the results of the CBSEM structural path analyses for the first part of this study.  Model fit 
was satisfactory for both the core PMT (χ2 / df = 1.552, CFI = 0.984, AIC = 204.156, and SRMR = .0374) 
and the full PMT (χ2 / df = 1.649, CFI = 0.960, AIC = 561.831, and SRMR = .0442) models.  Based on 
model fit statistics alone, the core PMT model was superior to the full PMT model with a higher CFI and a 
lower χ2 / df, AIC, and SRMR.  However, the core PMT model (SMC = 0.208) explained almost 15.1% less 
variance in protection motivation intentions than the full PMT model (SMC = 0.359).  The increased variance 
explained by the full PMT model was partially due to the fact that the full PMT model has three additional 
variables contributing to protection motivation; two of which (fear and response efficacy) are highly 
significant contributors that were not contained in the core PMT model.  However, since the fit statistics 
were still satisfactory, the full PMT model’s increased variance explained and fuller antecedent explanatory 
value indicate a better overall model in our data.  Figures 3 and 4 graphically display the results of structural 
path analyses. 
 
Figure 1. Core PMT Model Results 
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Based on the construct descriptive statistics (see Appendix A) and SEM path analysis (see Table 2), we 
see a few notable differences between our core and full PMT models.  Our respondents reported a strong 
belief in the ability of a password manager to counter the poor password management threat (response 
efficacy mean = 5.75, standard deviation = 0.916).  Yet, in our core PMT model response efficacy was a 
relatively weak contributor to protection motivation (β  =  0.147, p = 0.095) while it was a stronger and more 
significant contributor (β  = 0.147, p  <  0.05) in our full PMT model.  Additionally, while self-efficacy was the 
strongest antecedent of protection motivation intentions in our core model (β  =  0.312, p <  0.001), it fell out 
of significance with the addition of fear and response cost, which are two behavioral antecedents with 
defined negative connotations.  The threat appraisal constructs in our core and full PMT models were not 
directly significant contributors to protection motivation intentions.  As shown in Table 2 and Figures 3 & 4, 
coping appraisals contributed most strongly to our core PMT model’s relatively low explanatory power 
(20.8% of the variance of protection motivation intention) compared to our full PMT model. 
 
 
Figure 4. Full PMT Model Results 
 
Interestingly, our full PMT model results do not match the Boss et al. (2015) high fear appeal conditions, 
their low fear appeal conditions, or the Posey et al. (2015) full model.  Our fear path results most closely 
match the Boss et al. (2015) high conditions in both of their studies, but our main effects do not match either 
the high or the low fear appeal conditions reported by Boss et al. (2015).  Unfortunately, Posey et al.’s 
(2015) data did not permit them to report their full PMT nomological model, so it is difficult to conclude 
definitively how our full model is similar to or different from their reported results. 
Table 3 summarizes the path coefficients and SMC (R2) for our study, the Warkentin et al. (2016) PLS-SEM 
results and the Siponen et al. (2014) model.  As shown in Table 3, Warkentin et al.’s (2016) and Siponen et 
al.’s (2014) core PMT models yielded very different results from our study.  They both found a significant 
positive relationship for perceived threat vulnerability and severity, whereas we found no statistically 
significant relationship in our core PMT model.  Warkentin et al. (2016) found that both threat appraisal 
constructs and self-efficacy were strong and significant direct contributors that explained 82% of the 
variance of continued protective behavior intention.  Siponen et al. (2014) also reported significant paths for 
the threat appraisal constructs and self-efficacy similar to Warkentin et al. (2016) but their SMC was much 
lower (51%).  It is important to note that Siponen et al.’s (2014) model included the core PMT plus three 
additional constructs, which likely contributed to a larger SMC (relative to our core model) and could have 
impacted (positively or negatively) the coefficient sizes (and significance levels) for their reported core PMT 
constructs.   
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Low Fear  
Poseyb 
χ2 / df 1.552 1.649 2.02 2.017 2.702 2.911 1.794 
χ2 124.156 413.831 898.45 893.32 5729.01 6175.93 787.688 
df 80 251 444 443 2120 2121 439 
CFI 0.984 0.96 0.941 0.954 0.94 0.949 0.929 
SRMR 0.0374 0.0442 0.046
a 0.035a 0.062a 0.062a 0.046c 
PMI SMC 
0.208 0.359 0.881 0.419 0.777 0.672 0.351 
SEM Path 
Analyses     
  
        
TSEV→ Fear   0.377*** 0.406** 0.086 NS 0.320*** 0.174* 0.290*** 
PVUL→ Fear   0.309*** 0.507*** 0.185* 0.555*** 0.638*** Note d 
Fear → PMI   0.321*** 0.211*** 0.178 NS 0.467*** (-0.353)*** 0.086 NS 
TSEV→ PMI 0.109 NS (-0.022)NS 0.313*** 0.015 NS 0.194* 0.084 NS 0.062 NS 
PVUL→ PMI (-0.05)NS (-0.08)NS 0.170*** (-0.213)*** 0.286* 0.028 NS Not tested 











0.060 NS 0.237*** 0.310*** 0.236*** 
SEFF→ PMI 0.312*** 0.058 NS 0.09* 0.090 NS 0.291*** (-0.202)*** Note f 
COST→ PMI   (-0.273)* (-0.294)*** (-0.491)*** (-0.387)*** (-0.090)*** (-0.190)* 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, NS: Not Significant 
Legend: CFI = Comparative Fit Index, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual, PMI = Protection Motivation 
Intention, SMC = Squared Multiple Correlation, TSEV = Perceived Threat Severity, PVUL = Perceived Threat 
Vulnerability, MAL = Maladaptive Rewards, REFF = Response Efficacy, SEFF = Self Efficacy, COST = Response 
Costs, Boss = Boss et al. (2015), Posey = Posey et al. (2015) 
Notes: 
a: Their reported RMSEA is a comparable badness-of-fit test; RMSEA < 0.08 is considered satisfactory. 
b: Posey et al. (2015) included SETA frequency and organizational commitment, which are not included in the 
full PMT nomology. 
c: Reported RMSEA a comparable badness-of-fit test; RMSEA < 0.08 is considered satisfactory. 
d: Posey et al. (2015) dropped this path because it was highly correlated with the perceived threat severity path. 
e: The Posey et al. (2015) operationalization of maladaptive rewards is very different from the Boss et al. (2015) 
study and our study; our items for this construct were taken from Boss et al. (2015).  Therefore, these coefficients 
cannot be directly compared. 
f: Posey et al. (2015) dropped this path because it was highly correlated with the response efficacy path. 
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Table 3. Core PMT SEM Model Analysis Results 
Measurement Our Core PMT Warkentin et al. 
(2016)b 
Siponen et al. 
(2014) 
Protection Motivation Intention (PMI) 
Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC) or R2 0.208 0.82 0.51a 
Perceived Threat Severity → PMI 0.109 NS 0.414* 0.069* 
Perceived Threat Vulnerability → PMI (-0.05)NS 0.172** 0.062* 
Response Efficacy → PMI 0.147 (p=.095) 0.039 NS 0.013 NS 
Self-Efficacy → PMI 0.312*** 0.285** 0.087** 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, NS: Not Significant 
Notes: 
a: Siponen et al. (2014)'s model included the core PMT and three additional constructs,  
including two strongly-significant contributors that likely had a sizable impact on SMC  
and the strength of construct coefficients.  The results as shown do allow an examination  
of the path significance compared to the present and Warkentin et al. (2106) study. 
b: The Warkentin et al. (2016) study used PLS-SEM and not CBSEM. 
 
In our full PMT model, the most significant contributor to the participants’ protection motivations was fear.  
Our respondents reported a mild sense of fear about the password threat (mean = 4.71, standard deviation 
= 1.22), which provides empirical support to the Ruiter et al. (2014) finding that protection motivation can be 
activated by employing even small amounts of fear in a fear appeal.  None of the threat appraisal constructs 
(perceived threat severity, vulnerability, maladaptive rewards) in our full PMT nomology showed strong, 
significant effects on protection motivation intentions, which is consistent with our results from the core PMT 
model.  However, the findings for the coping appraisal constructs is quite different between our core and full 
PMT models.  Whereas in our core PMT model self-efficacy had a strong positive effect and response 
efficacy did not, these results were flipped in the full PMT model.  In the full PMT model, the effect of self-
efficacy was suppressed by the inclusion of the two negative-valence constructs (response costs and fear).  
Additionally, while self-efficacy diminished in explaining intentions, respondent’s belief in the efficacy of 
password managers emerged as the strongest of the positive-valence coping mechanisms. 
Although neither perceived threat severity nor vulnerability were significant direct contributors to protection 
motivations, the full PMT nomology posits that these two variables are at least partially mediated by fear.  
In order to test for mediation in the full PMT model, we used the bootstrapping method described in Hayes 
(2009) and illustrated in Vance, Lowry, and Eggett (2015).  Table 4 shows the results of the bootstrapping 
analysis using 5000 resamples.  These results indicate that fear does partially mediate the impact of both 
perceived threat severity and vulnerability on protection motivation intentions. 
 
Table 4. Bootstrapped CI Tests for Full and Partial Mediation in the Full PMT Model 
Variable 




















Severity 0.106 0.368 No -0.177 0.126 Yes Partial 
Perceived Threat 
Vulnerability 0.062 0.3 No -0.253 0.054 Yes Partial 
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4.2 Part 2: Actual Behaviors and Inhibiting and Enabling Factors   
The evaluation of the structural model in part 1 of the study helped clarify the relationships between the 
behavioral antecedents of the core and full PMT nomology based on self-reported behavioral intentions 
from the sample population.  Part 2 of our study provided a measure of how many participants actually 
followed-through and used a password manager, which is consistent with Boss et al.’s (2015) measure of 
actual usage.  However, from our reading of Boss et al. (2015) it is unclear how they estimated beta 
coefficients from the intention construct to the actual use construct given their small sample sizes, 
particularly in their high fear appeal groups.  Our sample size of 283 coupled with the binary outcome 
variable that we used for actual use made using CBSEM problematic for this path.  As such, we analyzed 
these data more descriptively. 
Of the 283 participants in our study, 38 (13.4%) installed and used the recommended password manager 
(LastPass).  The almost unanimous reason given for deciding to install and use the password manager was 
because the tool is effective at improving poor password management practices.  Participants in Part 2 of 
the study were also asked about their intentions to use password managers in the future.  A comparison of 
the behavioral intentions scores for Part 1 (mean = 5.43, n = 38, standard deviation = 1.32) and Part 2 
(mean = 5.40, n = 38, standard deviation = 1.58) for this group show no statistical differences (t = 0.181, df 
= 37, p = 0.858).  However, it is notable that the Part 1 behavioral intentions scores for those that did not 
install a password manager (mean = 4.05, n = 245, standard deviation = 1.43) is significantly lower than 
those that did (mean = 5.43, n = 38, standard deviation = 1.32). 
We then analyzed the behavioral intentions scores for the group of participants that chose not to use a 
password manager provides.  The Part 1 behavioral intentions scores (mean = 4.05, n = 245, standard 
deviation = 1.43) showed effectively neutral intentions to install and use a password manager, which played 
out in only a small percentage of participants actually performing the recommended security behavior.  
However, comparing the results of the Part 1 behavioral intentions scores with the Part 2 scores (mean = 
4.66, n = 245, standard deviation = 1.48) showed a statistically significant increase in the same population’s 
intention to use a password manager in the future (t = -7.02, df = 244, p < 0.001), which may potentially 
result in additional protective behavior adoption in the future.   
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Although the PMT started out as a single theory when it was first formulated (Rogers, 1975, 1983), 
behavioral information security researchers have applied different variations of the PMT to explain a variety 
of behavioral information security problems (Aurigemma, 2013; Crossler & Belanger, 2014; Herath & Rao, 
2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lee, Larose, & Rifon, 2008; Liang & Xue, 2010).  While the core PMT 
model is still frequently used, the full PMT model presented by Boss et al. (2015) and Posey et al. (2015) 
offers an extended, arguably more theoretically comprehensive nomological net with the incorporation of 
response costs, fear, and maladaptive rewards.4  In our study, we applied the core and full PMT nomologies 
to the longstanding security problem of poor password management in order to uncover factors that 
influence home end-user intentions and actual adoption of a password manager application. 
Even though the difference in variance explained between our core and full PMT models may suggest that 
future research should always build off the full PMT nomology, we do not make that recommendation.  Which 
version of the PMT is theoretically justified depends partially on the research objective.  For example, one 
goal of the Boss et al. (2015) paper was to explore the research opportunities and gains afforded by 
measuring the impact of different fear-appeal manipulations on users’ behaviors.  In this case, the 
manipulation and measurement of fear is a centerpiece of the research goal and justifies, if not requires, 
the use of the full PMT.  In comparison, the goal of the Siponen et al. (2014) paper was to present and test 
a multi-theory model of employee Information Security Policy (ISP) compliance across a range of security 
threats and actions included in the respondents’ security policies.  In the case of Siponen et al. (2014), they 
captured cross-sectional behavioral data from four real organizations to test their integrated model.  Siponen 
et al. (2014) did not directly manipulate or capture fear in their study.  Instead, they relied upon the 
                                                     
4 While the importance of the fear appeal in the PMT-related literature is widely accepted, there is some research that questions the 
importance of fear (one of the components of a fear appeal) as a behavioral motivator. Warkentin, Johnston, Walden, and Straub 
(2016) recently conducted a study that examined the impact of fear appeals on participants using fMRI data.  They found that while 
fear appeals activated threat and threat response assessments, they found no evidence of an actual fear response.  This finding is in 
contrast with Boss et al. (2015), Posey et al. (2016), and our study (albeit using significantly different research methods).  
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documented activities of the employees’ organizations security awareness and training education programs 
to provide organization-specific fear appeals.  Although Siponen et al. (2014) did not directly manipulate or 
measure fear in their study, they were still able to incorporate and evaluate the core PMT constructs in their 
integrated model based upon the specific goals of their research, which were different from the goals of 
Boss et al.’s (2015) paper.  Therefore, it would be ill-advised to claim that Siponen et al.’s (2014) PMT model 
is an inferior model simply because they did not use the nomology proposed by Boss et al. (2015) and 
Posey et al. (2015).  
In our study, both the core and full PMT models performed rather poorly in explaining the variance in 
participant protection motivation intentions relative to the previously published research.  One possible 
reason for this disparity is that the security threats and actions were significantly different in our study from 
the comparison studies.  In the Warkentin et al. (2016) study, for instance, participant data was captured 
over time for initial installation and continued use of a simulated anti-malware program.  In their study, 
participants voluntarily installed a security program that reminded them to use the software at least weekly.  
The level of effort required by the participants was highest in the beginning of their study when voluntarily 
visiting the software download page and installing the software.  Continued use of the software required the 
students to approve the “scanning” of their computer with the software when prompted.  The malware threat 
and associated security actions in their study are very different from those experienced by participants in 
our study.  Our study directly recommended but did not provide a prompt to actually install and use a 
password manager.   
Furthermore, home-end users may be more aware of a threat of a virus relative to the threat associated 
with reusing a password or employing a relatively weak password (Huth, Orlando, & Pesante, 2013; Zeltser, 
2015).  Additionally, we suggest that using a password manager is a sufficiently different security action 
from anti-malware applications in the sense that there is a potentially steep initial learning curve and a fairly 
high setup cost associated with adopting password managers before the applications become easy to use 
and useful.  This threat context is quite different from the anti-malware (Boss et al., 2015, Warkentin et al., 
2016) and data backup contexts (Boss et al., 2015), because there typically is not a high learning curve or 
an initially high set up cost associated with installing and using those types of applications over time. 
The Boss et al.’s (2015) variance explained in both of their fear appeal groups across their two studies was 
significantly higher than the reported variance explained in our full PMT nomology.  One possible 
explanation for this difference is that the Boss et al. (2015) studies involved repeated measures with 
repeated security fear appeal messages being presented to participants during use of their computing 
devices.  In the context of anti-malware and data backups, the repeated fear appeal message approach is 
reasonable.  Our study, however, is more reflective of a health-related public service advisory (PSA) type 
of fear appeal where our threat message does not occur on a regularly recurring basis.  Our message 
introduces the fear appeal to participants, which for many of our participants may have been their first 
exposure to the threat and the coping mechanism.  Additionally, our fear appeal was relatively short and 
non-recurring which, coupled with our different security related action, may explain the difference in variance 
explained and path coefficient differences from the comparison studies. 
Interestingly, Boss et al. (2015) manipulated fear appeals in their quasi-experimental study whereas Posey 
et al. (2015) and our study did not manipulate fear appeals.  This controlled manipulation allowed Boss et 
al. (2015) to test the impact of the PMT constructs using different fear appeals, which they categorized as 
high and low.  However, the Boss et al. (2015) study did not have a control group in their quasi-experiment 
so it is difficult to determine how their low and high fear appeal groups differed from a control group.  Both 
groups in their two studies were manipulated.  Nevertheless, different constructs may become more 
important or less important depending on the threat message or the coping response contained in different 
fear appeals.  Therefore, it is possible that the differences in the full PMT nomology reported by Posey et 
al. (2015) and our paper may be attributable to characteristics of the fear appeal in addition to (or instead 
of) the differences in the security action that was investigated.    
Irrespective of our explanation for why our results vary from the results reported for other studies using the 
core and full PMT models, our different results do suggest that researchers should be cautious about 
universally applying either instantiation of the PMT to all behavioral information security threats and actions.  
It may very well be that both the core and full PMT models are more capable of explaining the variance with 
the types of security behaviors examined in the Warkentin et al. (2016) and Boss et al. (2015) papers and 
less capable for security actions like using password managers.  Password managers are not as familiar to 
users, have higher initial setup costs, and/or do not provide repeated fear appeal messages and prompts.  
Given these differences, our results suggest further replication of these models is needed using different 
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types of security actions, different types of research designs, and different types of fear appeals.  It is not 
possible to conclude that our theoretical replication study is better or worse than the previously published 
papers because each has its own strengths and weaknesses.  However, the different path coefficients and 
variance explained does suggest that there is a scientific need to further replicate both the core and full 
PMT nomologies. 
There are several limitations with our replication study.  Our study only considered a pre-set time interval 
between the two surveys, which may have not been enough time for some of our research participants to 
act on the fear appeal.  An interesting future study may investigate greater time spacing between when 
intentions are measured and when actual behaviors are determined.  Ideally, a longer longitudinal study 
with more realistic organizational manipulations would be useful in measuring behavioral intentions, actual 
adoptions, and continued usage over a much longer time period would help reveal further insights into the 
core and full PMT models.  Additionally, our study examines the performance of both PMT models (core 
and full) using a single fear appeal message.  Therefore, our reported differences between Boss et al. (2015) 
may be a function of the fear appeal.  Future research may offer an empirical replication of the Boss et al. 
(2015) instead of our theoretical replication.  Those two studies can then be interpreted in tandem to further 
contextualize our reported results.  Finally, we measured maladaptive rewards using the construct definition 
and items from Boss et al. (2015), which are very different from the conceptualization and construct 
measurement items from Posey et al. (2015).  Posey et al.’s (2015) operationalization of maladaptive 
rewards measures intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, which may modify the relative size and magnitude of the 
effect of maladaptive rewards on protection motivation.  Future assessments should seek to gain more 
comprehensive understanding of maladaptive rewards for use in PMT-related studies.   
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Appendix A. Construct Definitions and Measurement Items 
 
Construct 











Self-reported intention to perform 
the security behavior. 
I intend to use a password manager 
in the next week. 
BINT1 0.95 4.24 1.52 
I predict I will use a password 
manager in the next week. 
BINT2 0.98 4.23 1.54 
I plan to use a password manager in 
the next week. 
BINT3 0.93 4.25 1.57 
Fear A negatively valenced emotion 
representing a response that 
arises from recognizing danger. 
This response may include any 
combination of apprehension, 
fright, arousal, concern, worry, 
discomfort, or a general negative 
mood, and it manifests itself 
emotionally, cognitively, and 
physically (Leventhal, 1970; 
McIntosh, Zajonc, Vig, & 
Emerick, 1997; Osman, Barrios, 
Osman, Schneekloth, & 
Troutman, 1994; Witte, 1992, 
1996, 1998) 
I am worried about the prospect of 
having my online account 
passwords stolen and abused by 
cybercriminals. 
FEAR1 0.78 4.95 1.31 
I am frightened about the prospect 
of having my online account 
passwords stolen and abused by 
cybercriminals. 
FEAR2 0.85 4.82 1.37 
I am anxious about the prospect of 
having my online account 
passwords stolen and abused by 
cybercriminals. 
FEAR3 0.79 4.42 1.48 
Self-efficacy 
  
“The perceived ability of the 
person to actually carry out the 
adaptive [coping] response” 
(Floyd et al., 2000, p. 411; 
Maddux & Rogers, 1983) 
  
Password manager software is easy 
to use. 
SE1 0.82 5.27 1.11 
Password manager software is 
convenient to use. 
SE2 0.83 5.15 1.18 
I am able to use password software 
without much effort. 




The general rewards (intrinsic 
and extrinsic) of not protecting 
oneself, contrary to the fear 
appeal (Floyd et al., 2000; 
Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) 
 
Using a password manager would 
slow down the speed of my access 
to the Internet. 
MAL1 0.67 3.52 1.51 
Using a password manager would 
slow down my computer. 
MAL2 0.88 3.01 1.35 
Using a password manager would 
interfere with other programs on my 
computer. 
MAL3 0.93 3.05 1.38 
Using a password manager would 
limit the functionality of computer. 
MAL4 0.88 2.94 1.31 
Response 
Costs 
“Any costs (e.g., monetary, 
personal, time, effort) associated 
with taking the adaptive coping 
response” (Floyd et al., 2000, p. 
411) 
There is too much work associated 
with trying to increase the security of 
my online account. passwords 
through the use of a password 
manager application 
COST1 0.84 5.77 1.01 
Using a password manager 
application on my computer would 
require considerable investment of 
effort other than time. 
COST2 0.88 5.75 0.97 
Using a password manager 
application would be time 
consuming. 
COST3 0.76 5.73 1.11 
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“How personally susceptible an 
individual feels to the 
communicated threat” (Milne, 
Sheeran, & Orebell, 2000, p. 108) 
My online account passwords are 
at risk of being stolen and abused 
by cyber-criminals 
PVUL1  0.85 4.93 1.33 
It is likely that my online account 
passwords will be stolen and 
abused by cyber-criminals. 
PVUL2 0.70 4.10 1.36 
It is possible that my online 
account passwords will be stolen 
and abused by cyber-criminals. 




“How serious the individual 
believes that the threat would be” 
to him- or herself (Milne et al., 
2000, p. 108) 
If my online account passwords 
were stolen and abused by cyber-
criminals, it would be severe. 
TSEV1 0.71 5.81 1.18 
If my online account passwords 
were stolen and abused by cyber-
criminals, it would be serious. 
TSEV2 0.92 6.07 1.02 
If my online account passwords 
were stolen and abused by cyber-
criminals, it would be significant. 
TSEV3 0.76 5.94 1.20 
Response 
Efficacy 
“The belief that the adaptive 
[coping] response will work, that 
taking the protective action will be 
effective in protecting the self or 
others” (Floyd et al., 2000, p. 411; 
Maddux & Rogers, 1983) 
Password manager applications 
work to protect my online account 
passwords from being stolen and 
abused by cyber-criminals. 
REFF1 0.82 5.77 1.01 
Password manager applications 
are an effective solution to protect 
my online account passwords 
from being stolen and abused by 
cyber-criminals. 
REFF2 0.71 5.75 0.97 
When using a password manager 
application, online passwords are 
more likely to be protected from 
being stolen and abused by 
cyber-criminals. 
REFF3 0.80 5.73 1.11 
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Appendix B. Video Script 
Welcome to this video on password manager applications, why you should use one, and how to get started 
quickly and for free.  Following is a short, 2-minute animation that does a great job at discussing the 
problems we all face with passwords and what we can do about it. 
[The following script is from the EFF’s video about using password managers found at 
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/animated-overview-using-password-managers-stay-safe-online]  
You get a lot done on the internet that means you probably have a lot of accounts with tons of websites 
right? But do you use the same password on all of them? Or do you almost use the same password and 
change it a little bit for each site? Well, that’s a problem.  
If you use the same password on every website and just one of these websites gets broken into by 
cybercriminals and there is always one site you use that is not secure then those thieves could get the 
passwords of everyone on that site. Then they can use them to break into all those other accounts.  
These kinds of break-ins happen far more often than you think. Sometimes they even happen without the 
hacked website knowing. So don’t reuse your passwords!  
But wait! If you have lots of website accounts and each of them now needs a unique password how can you 
possibly remember them all? Aren’t we supposed to keep our passwords in our heads and never write them 
down? Writing them down is actually not that bad of an idea. If you use lots of passwords write them down 
and keep them somewhere safe like your wallet then you will at least know if your passwords go missing or 
get stolen, that’s more than you might know if you use just one password everywhere and then a website 
you use is silently hacked and even a safer plan though is to use a password manager.  
Password Managers are programs you can download for your phone or computer, it will create, store and 
even automatically fill in unique passwords on websites and other online services. It can keep all of your 
account details safe and synchronize them between all of your devices. So, you never have to remember 
all those passwords again. You can search for password managers reviews so you can find out what the 
most secure net users out there prefer. Use password managers to resist the temptation to use one 
password on all your sites. Remember it’s a trap.  
There is one catch with password managers though, password managers do need a password for 
themselves. One that you use to type into the password manager to access all of your other passwords. 
You will want that password to be extra secure but easy to remember because it is the one password you 
won’t be able to store in your password manager. But that one password will keep you a lot safer in a 
sometimes dangerous net. [End EFF video script] 
That’s an interesting video… but maybe it doesn’t apply to you?  Perhaps you don’t have many passwords 
to worry about.  Let’s think about it – what are some of your accounts that need passwords?  Maybe you 
have some social media accounts?  Did you find a great idea on Pinterest about taking Vine videos of the 
latest Starbucks drink, then taking a picture of the cup and posting it on Snapchat, Tumblr, Facebook and 
Twitter while simultaneously telling their 5 different friend groups on GroupMe, Kik, and WhatsAp to please 
like their Instagram photo of this once-in-a-lifetime event. 
Maybe you do some online shopping?  Holiday shopping on Amazon or Etsy, Target, ebay, or maybe 
Walmart for the cheap stuff. And don’t forget you have to pay for all of those purchases by putting in your 
credit card. 
And when you are hard at work, you might need a break with some of your many online entertainment 
options (feel like binge watching Game of Thrones, anyone?).  And don’t forget your multiple home and 
work email accounts that you have to constantly check all day long.  
Come to think of it… when you start counting all the applications that you use that require passwords, 
knowing that each one is supposed to have a strong unique password you probably have A LOT more 
passwords to deal with than originally thought. 
So, OK, maybe there is a password management problem we all have to deal with.  But are password 
managers a safe solution?  The answer is generally yes.  While there will always be some level of risk 
associated with locking all of your passwords up in one file, even if it is highly encrypted, the benefits of 
using a password manager are considered much greater than the alternative of using, and reusing, weak 
or predictable passwords.   
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The US Department of Homeland Defense’s Computer Emergency Readiness Team and the internationally 
recognized information security training and awareness organization, the SANS institute, both strongly 
recommend the use of password managers.   As well as just about every major technology, news, and 
consumer advocacy group. 
Fortunately, there are many password manager applications to choose from with prices starting as low as 
FREE.  For example, three popular password managers are LastPass, 1Password, and Dashlane.  
All good password managers provide similar functionality, such as: 
 Importing existing passwords from your web browsers.  Many of us use more than one web 
browser sometimes on different computers, which can be very unsafe. 
 Password managers also not only help you easily create strong and unique passwords for each 
site, but automatically capture login credentials when logging into a site for the first time. 
 Another important feature in a good password manager is the ability to check the security level of 
all of your current passwords.  For example, LastPass and 1Password both allow you to check all 
your passwords to identify all the weak, old, reused and yes, even known COMPROMISED 
accounts.   
For example, if you had a LinkedIn, Yahoo, or Snapchat account any time in the past several years, there 
is a real possibility that hackers stole your account credentials.  Having a password manager that keeps 
track of major account hacks, so that you don’t have to, is a great benefit.   
Password managers sound useful, so what’s the next step? First, you are strongly recommended to start 
using a password manager as soon as possible.  We recommend LastPass because it is well established 
and offers great password management functionality and its FREE.  Just got to www.lastpass.com to 
download a version for your Mac, PC, or even Linux. After you install the desktop version of LastPass, you 
should be prompted to import your current web browser account passwords.  You should definitely do this 
because it not only automatically populates some of your passwords, but makes you safer by getting rid of 
these passwords in the much-less-secure browser password storage. After you have LastPass populated 
with some passwords, run the Security Challenge; this will test the strength of your Master Password and 
all your individual passwords.  The security challenge will identify all your compromised, weak, reused or 
old passwords and then even help you with the process of changing them to strong, secure passwords.     
In summary, we all have many account passwords that we need to protect.  The simple truth is that it’s too 
hard for most of us to create and remember a lot of passwords, even bad passwords.  All of our passwords 
should be strong and unique, which makes memorizing our passwords even harder!  Strong passwords 
should be 12 characters or longer with mixed letters, numbers, and special characters.   
Password managers allow us to create and remember one strong, unique password, our Master Password, 
which unlocks all our other account passwords.   Security experts recommend using password managers 
because they are safe and effective.  Whether you use a free password manager like LastPass or a paid 
version like 1Password, the investment is well worth it! 
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